Initial offers and outcomes in wage bargaining: who wins?

Sergi Jimenez-Martin and Jaume Garcia Villar

Empirical Economics, 2010, vol. 39, issue 3, 815-846

Keywords: Claim; Offer; Wage settlement; Bargaining power; Collective bargaining; Wages; Panel data; Sample selection; J50; D82; C33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Working Paper: Initial Offers and Outcomes in Wage Barganing: Who Wins? (2007)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00181-009-0324-4

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