Do time limits in the sickness insurance system increase return to work?

Pathric Hägglund ()

Empirical Economics, 2013, vol. 45, issue 1, 567-582

Abstract: This article analyzes the effect of stricter enforcement of the eligibility criteria in the Swedish sickness insurance (SI) system. In 2008, time-restricted assessments of the individual’s working capacity on the 91st and 181st sick day was introduced. Taking advantage of the quasi-experimental feature of the intervention, I find a large and significant increased exit rate around the 181-day assessment. The impact is the result of longer spells outside SI-benefits, indicating that the stricter rules create disincentives to report sick. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Keywords: Public sickness insurance; Policy evaluation; Natural experiment; H55; I18; J22; J28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1007/s00181-012-0618-9

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