Stackelberg game analysis of government subsidy policy in green product market

Xin Chen (), Jiannan Li (), Decai Tang (), Ziqian Zhao () and Valentina Boamah ()
Additional contact information
Xin Chen: Sanjiang University
Jiannan Li: Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology
Decai Tang: Sanjiang University
Ziqian Zhao: Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology
Valentina Boamah: Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology

Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, 2024, vol. 26, issue 5, No 88, 13273-13302

Abstract: Abstract With the development of the digital economy, digital technology can help enterprises achieve digital, intelligent, and green transformation. However, the cost of enterprise transformation is high, and government subsidies can help reduce enterprise risks. In this study, based on the Stackelberg game model, a three-stage game model was established for government, manufacturer, and retail. Through theoretical proof and numerical simulation, the effects of cost subsidies, research and development subsidies, and sales subsidies policies were analyzed. The research shows that these three subsidy methods can promote the greening of products, increase market sales, and increase the profits of manufacturers and retailers, and the effect of R&D subsidies is more obvious. Excessive R&D subsidies will cause the social welfare function to decline. As consumers’ green preferences increase, the profits and social welfare of manufacturers and retailers also increase. Consumers’ green preferences can effectively improve the green level of products, increase product sales, and promote the development of green products. Under the optimal subsidy strategy, cost and sales subsidies are superior to R&D subsidies. By studying the effects of different subsidy policies, this study provides reasonable policies and suggestions for the government and the manufacturing industry.

Keywords: Government subsidy policy; Product greenness; Consumer green preferences; Stackelberg game model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10668-023-04176-y Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:endesu:v:26:y:2024:i:5:d:10.1007_s10668-023-04176-y

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10668

DOI: 10.1007/s10668-023-04176-y

Access Statistics for this article

Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development is currently edited by Luc Hens

More articles in Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().