Nonpoint pollution regulation targeted on emission proxies: the role of yardstick schemes

Alessio D’Amato and Laurent Franckx
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Alessio D'Amato ()

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 2010, vol. 12, issue 4, 218 pages

Keywords: Moral hazard; Emission proxies; Diffuse pollution; Multitasking; Yardstick competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1007/s10018-010-0171-8

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