Commitment or no-commitment to monitoring in emission tax systems?

Hsiao-Chi Chen (), Shi-Miin Liu and Chiung-Yun Chang

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 2013, vol. 15, issue 2, 188 pages

Abstract: This paper analyzes and compares behaviors of regulators and polluting firms in emission tax systems with and without commitment to monitoring. In the commitment case, firms can be compliant or non-compliant at equilibria. Firms’ compliance implies that regulators will face the paradox of ex ante commitment to monitoring. However, we find that the commitment system is at least as efficient as the no-commitment system. This suggests that the commitment system has merit even the paradox of ex ante commitment may exist. Finally, relative magnitudes of firms’ optimal and reported emissions in the two systems are uncertain, unless their weights in the social cost function are greater than or equal to one. Relative values of equilibrium monitoring probabilities and fines in the two systems are also unsure. Copyright Springer 2013

Keywords: Commitment; Emission tax; Fine; Monitoring; No-commitment; Q50; Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10018-012-0046-2 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:envpol:v:15:y:2013:i:2:p:171-188

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... mental/journal/10018

DOI: 10.1007/s10018-012-0046-2

Access Statistics for this article

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies is currently edited by Ken-Ichi Akao

More articles in Environmental Economics and Policy Studies from Springer, Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().