Collective action and other-regarding behavior: an assessment of games vs reality in Thailand

Rawadee Jarungrattanapong () and Suparee Boonmanunt
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Rawadee Jarungrattanapong: Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 2020, vol. 22, issue 4, No 1, 485-507

Abstract: Abstract In social dilemmas where personal benefits are in conflict with collective benefits, there is an incentive for people to behave non-cooperatively as free-riders. However, everyday observation reveals seemingly unselfish behavior or so-called “other-regarding behavior,” which can be a motivation driving conservation decisions. This study presents evidence on how villagers behave in other-regarding games (the dictator game, trust game, and public good game), and how they behave in their actual collective actions in community conservation activities. Findings of the public good game had significant external validity with actual cooperative activities, suggesting that voluntary cooperation behavior plays a key role in real-life cooperative decision-making. However, none of the results of the answers to attitudinal trust questions provides any predictive value in estimating participation rates in conservation activities.

Keywords: Cooperation; External validity problem; Collective action; Lab-in-the-field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D64 H41 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10018-020-00266-7

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