Strategic environmental policy in a differentiated duopoly with overlapping ownership: a welfare analysis

Yang-Ming Chang and Manaf Sellak ()
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Manaf Sellak: Washburn University

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 2024, vol. 26, issue 2, No 5, 199-217

Abstract: Abstract This paper analyzes strategic environmental policy when polluting firms engage in overlapping ownership arrangements (OOAs) under differentiated duopoly with quantity competition. Specifically, we focus on two pollution control instruments: emission taxes and standards. The key findings are as follows: (i) Compared to the case without ownership, the optimal environmental tax rate and absolute standard are higher (lower) when the polluting firms’ products are complements (substitutes). (ii) Both the tax and standard policies are equally efficient in their effects on the firms’ output and abatement decisions, consumer surplus, environmental quality, and social welfare, regardless of whether the differentiated products are complements or substitutes. (iii) If the government sets equity share and emission tax (or standard) simultaneously to maximize social welfare, the optimal equity share may exceed 50% for OOA firms producing two complements and is inversely related to the degree of product complementarity. Our results have welfare implications for the choice of environmental regulation between taxes and standards, when equity share is exogenous, or when the government determines an optimal mix of equity share and emission tax (or standard).

Keywords: Environmental policy; Ownership structure; Product differentiation; Welfare implications (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 L13 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10018-022-00343-z

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