Environmental conflicts with SLAPP reputations

Chad Settle and Jason Shogren

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 2001, vol. 4, issue 2, 129-139

Abstract: Firms use the strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) against citizens who complain about poor compliance with environmental rules and regulations. As a consequence, lawmakers have proposed banning SLAPPs in public debate. Theory suggests, however, that a SLAPP ban might be inefficient because it eliminates the efficient signaling equilibrium. This study extends the conflict model to include reputation effects. Our results suggest that a SLAPP ban can increase efficiency but only under a restrictive set of assumptions. One such assumption is that a ban makes sense when firms do not use the SLAPP to build a reputation, which contradicts the spirit of why firms use it in the first place. A SLAPP ban might increase efficiency, however, if it reduces the efficiency losses of chills during the interim periods when a firm builds its reputation. Copyright Springer Japan 2001

Keywords: Conflict; Reputation; SLAPP; Environmental policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1007/BF03353920

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