Tax compliance and workability of the pricing and standards approach

Naoki Shiota

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 2008, vol. 9, issue 3, 193-211

Abstract: It is demonstrated that the effectiveness of the pricing and standards approach (PSA) to emission control is seriously impaired by imperfect tax compliance of regulated firms, contrary to literature reports. If there exists a firm that attempts to commit 100% tax evasion, PSA fails to minimize the social abatement cost, and when all firms take the risk of total tax evasion, PSA no longer reduces emissions. Heavy taxes give firms incentive to cheat, so the government is only able to adopt PSA when target levels of total emission reductions are relatively small. Copyright Springer Japan 2008

Keywords: Compliance; Efficiency; Enforcement; Pollution; Unit tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF03353990 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:envpol:v:9:y:2008:i:3:p:193-211

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... mental/journal/10018

DOI: 10.1007/BF03353990

Access Statistics for this article

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies is currently edited by Ken-Ichi Akao

More articles in Environmental Economics and Policy Studies from Springer, Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().