Tax evasion and competition in a differentiated duopoly

Luciano Fanti and Domenico Buccella

Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, 2021, vol. 48, issue 3, No 4, 385-411

Abstract: Abstract This paper investigates the relation between market competition and firms’ tax evasion in a duopoly with differentiated products under both Bertrand and Cournot conjectures. The previous literature has shown that competition can lead to higher or lower tax evasion. Our paper can help to conciliate these different results by showing that a negative or a positive relation depends on what causes competitive pressure (i.e. an increase of the marginal cost, a higher product substitutability or a change of the mode of competition) and the pre-existing level of competition.

Keywords: Tax compliance; Evasion; Competition; Duopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40812-020-00174-7 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:epolin:v:48:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s40812-020-00174-7

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/40812

DOI: 10.1007/s40812-020-00174-7

Access Statistics for this article

Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics is currently edited by C. Cambini, M.G. Colombo, L. Piscitello, L. Rondi and A. Zanfei

More articles in Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics from Springer, Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().