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Individual and institutional determinants of corruption in the EU countries: the problem of its tolerance

Jan Hunady ()

Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, 2017, vol. 34, issue 1, 139-157

Abstract: Abstract This paper deals with the problem of corruption, with a focus on both individual and country-specific institutional factors that may affect this problem. We analyse the determinants of the incidence of corruption as well as the tolerance of corruption. We used logit regressions that utilised data derived from Eurobarometer. The results strongly suggest gender, age, and education are important factors. We may say that anti-corruption policy ought to be targeted towards younger, less-educated, self-employed people with no children. On the other hand, a better-educated man in his early 30s seems to be a typical victim of corruption. The same is true for those having problems paying their expenses. Furthermore, contact with public officials appears to be one of the key issues, with Internet-based interactions with the government perhaps serving as the most effective solution to this problem. The rule of law, government effectiveness, and public accountability seem to be other factors that negatively correlate with the level of corruption within a country.

Keywords: Tolerance of corruption; Determinants of corruption; Institutional factors; Public policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H11 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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