Joint liability taxation and group auditing

Francesco Reito () and Salvatore Spagano ()
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Francesco Reito: University of Catania, DEI
Salvatore Spagano: University of Catania, DEI

Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, 2017, vol. 34, issue 2, No 7, 305-327

Abstract: Abstract This article proposes a taxation policy based on joint liability among taxpayers. We show that it is possible to obtain a Pareto improving equilibrium in which the per-capita tax burden is reduced, and taxpayers are better off with respect to the standard individual liability taxation.

Keywords: Tax evasion; Joint liability taxation; Group auditing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 H26 H30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s40888-016-0043-1

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