Competition and environmental quality as conflicting objectives: the case of the European municipal waste industry

Francesco Silvestri ()
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Francesco Silvestri: University of Modena and Reggio Emilia

Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, 2017, vol. 34, issue 3, No 9, 513 pages

Abstract: Abstract The article focuses on the European Union (EU) municipal waste (MW) industry, examining the conjoint functioning of EU self sufficiency principle and proximity principle (SSP/PP). Using standard IO models, we derive the quota of recycled MW under different kinds of market competition. We show that the percentage of unsorted MW, and the connected environmental problems, increases with competition, so that social welfare is lower as compared to SSP/PP implementation. Nonetheless, higher market competition in the MW industry matched with Pigouvian taxation improves social welfare upon SSP/PP.

Keywords: Competition policy; Externality; EU regulation; Solid waste; Environmental taxation; L13; L44; Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40888-017-0067-1

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