Corruption in environmental policy: the case of waste

Berardino Cesi (), Alessio D’Amato () and Mariangela Zoli
Additional contact information
Berardino Cesi: University of Rome “Tor Vergata”
Alessio D’Amato: University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, and SEEDS
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Alessio D'Amato ()

Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, 2019, vol. 36, issue 1, No 4, 65-78

Abstract: Abstract This paper investigates interactions between waste and enforcement policies in the presence of a corruptible bureaucrat. We set up a repeated game obtained by an infinite repetition of a three stage game, where a firm producing illegal waste can bribe a bureaucrat in charge of monitoring its disposal choices. The bureaucrat may accept or not the bribe and chooses whether to hide illegal waste disposal to a national waste authority. We study conditions under which corruption can arise in equilibrium, and find that illegal disposal is larger under corruption, while, surprisingly, the bribe does not necessarily decrease with the punishment for detected corruption. Finally, our analysis suggests that increasing the interactions between the regulated firm and the bureaucrat increases illegal disposal via corruption.

Keywords: Waste management; Illegal disposal; Corruption; Enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 K42 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40888-017-0087-x Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:epolit:v:36:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s40888-017-0087-x

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/40888

DOI: 10.1007/s40888-017-0087-x

Access Statistics for this article

Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics is currently edited by Alberto Quadrio Curzio

More articles in Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics from Springer, Fondazione Edison
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().