How do people choose their commuting mode? An evolutionary approach to travel choices

Chiara Calastri (), Simone Borghesi and Giorgio Fagiolo ()
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Chiara Calastri: University of Leeds

Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, 2019, vol. 36, issue 3, No 10, 887-912

Abstract: Abstract A considerable amount of studies in the transport literature is aimed at understanding the behavioural processes underlying travel choices, like mode and destination choices. In the present work, we propose the use of evolutionary game theory as a framework to study commuter mode choice. Evolutionary game models work under the assumptions that agents are boundedly rational and imitate others’ behaviour. We examine the possible dynamics that can emerge in a homogeneous urban population where commuters can choose between two modes, private car or public transport. We obtain a different number of equilibria depending on the values of the parameters of the model. We carry out comparative-static exercises and examine possible policy measures that can be implemented in order to modify the agents’ payoff, and consequently the equilibria of the system, leading society towards more sustainable transportation patterns.

Keywords: Commuter choices; Transportation; Travel behaviour; Evolutionary dynamics; Evolutionary game theory; Bounded rationality; Environmental policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 Q50 R40 R41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40888-018-0099-1

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