Economics at your fingertips  

The political economy of municipal consortia and municipal mergers

Giuseppe Di Liddo and Michele Giuranno ()

Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, 2020, vol. 37, issue 1, No 5, 105-135

Abstract: Abstract This paper analyses both the policy and welfare consequences of municipal mergers vs municipal consortia in the presence of spillovers and inequalities in the districts size. Citizens of different municipalities have a common interest in internalising spillovers, but conflicting interests on how to reach that goal. We address the question of when, from a welfare point of view, the central government should legislate in favour of municipal mergers and when, instead, it should prefer municipal consortia. Results provide some useful insights for the design of local governments reforms.

Keywords: Municipal amalgamation; Municipal cooperation; Centralization; Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 H73 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1007/s40888-019-00169-1

Access Statistics for this article

Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics is currently edited by Alberto Quadrio Curzio

More articles in Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics from Springer, Fondazione Edison
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

Page updated 2022-01-04
Handle: RePEc:spr:epolit:v:37:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s40888-019-00169-1