When the two ends meet: an experiment on cooperation and social capital

Pietro Battiston and Simona Gamba

Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, 2020, vol. 37, issue 3, No 7, 940 pages

Abstract: Abstract We study the behaviour of individuals with different geographic origins interacting in a same public good game. We exploit the peculiar composition of the experimental sample to compare the performance of groups where individuals have mixed origins to homogeneous groups. We find that, despite the absence of any geographic framing, mixed groups exhibit significantly lower contributions. We also find that cooperation levels differ significantly across geographic origins, in line with the existing literature. This is explained by a different impact of coordination opportunities, such as communication, as we show by manipulating them. Our results point towards integration as a crucial aspect for the economic development of intercultural societies. They also confirm that, rather than being explained just by the differences in institutions and economic opportunities, the Italian North–South divide embeds elements of distrust, prejudice and a consequent path dependence in the level of social capital

Keywords: Public good; Cooperation; Social capital; Cultural differences; Lab experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C71 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: When the two ends meet: an experiment on cooperation across the Italian North-South divide (2016)
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DOI: 10.1007/s40888-020-00184-7

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