The expertise effect: the impact of legal specialists’ intervention on the timely delivery of laymen's judgments

Umberto Nizza ()
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Umberto Nizza: University of Verona

Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, 2023, vol. 40, issue 2, No 8, 589-614

Abstract: Abstract France relies exclusively on lay assessors to solve conflicts between entrepreneurs and employees for the longest time compared to any other civil jurisdiction. Given the lack of legal training of labor judges, the paper tests whether an intensification in the offer for legal services, whether coming from professional judges or specialized labor lawyers, induces delays in the procedure. Using a two-stage least squared estimating method and an innovative dataset on French labor courts between 2013 and 2017, the manuscript estimates the effect of an increase in the intervention of legal experts in labor litigation. The analysis showed that referrals to a professional judge delay labor cases’ solutions but refuted the long-standing economic theory that lawyers induce delay to acquire higher fees. This study indicates that the current structure of employment courts, entirely left in the hand of laymen with little knowledge of the ever-changing labor legislation, should be reconsidered to foster collaborative solutions accounting for industrial experience and, at the same time, legal competency.

Keywords: Courts' delay; Professional judges; Lay assessors; Attorneys (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J53 K41 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s40888-022-00277-5

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