On the propensity to settle or litigate in laboratory disputes

Matteo Migheli () and Margherita Saraceno
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Matteo Migheli: University of Torino
Margherita Saraceno: University of Pavia

Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, 2023, vol. 40, issue 2, No 9, 615-642

Abstract: Abstract This study experimentally investigates the role of the origin of victims' resources on the propensity to settle or litigate a dispute. The analysis focuses on victims’ decision to use a costly and uncertain procedure, that is, litigation, to recover money from offenders and on offenders’ decision to hand over what they have taken before litigation starts. The results suggest that although the share of offenders who return money increases once they learn that the victims have had to work to gain their resources, the threat of a costly dispute is stronger than any consideration about the origin of victims’ resources. In this study, the religiosity and gender of decision makers are included among the control variables because it is traditionally debated how these individual features are able to affect’ individuals’ attitudes in conflicts and their resolutions. In particular, gender seems to play a significant role since the main results are driven by female decision makers.

Keywords: Litigation; Sense of justice; Second-party-costly punishment; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 D74 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s40888-022-00287-3

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