The gender bias in regional councilors’ reelection in Italy

Roberto Cellini and Tiziana Cuccia

Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, 2024, vol. 41, issue 1, No 3, 47-83

Abstract: Abstract This study evaluates whether a gender bias exists in the reelection of regional councilors in Italy. A dataset of 4794 councilors elected since 1985 is considered; 597 (i.e., 12.45%) among them are women. The determinants of the reelection are analyzed. A significant gender bias in reelection emerges, even after controlling for several individual and institutional factors. The gender bias in reelection is stable over time, similar across different traditional political parties, and similar in different geographical areas. Institutional and individual factors are also studied in the interaction with gender bias.

Keywords: Italy; Regions; Gender; Regional councilor; Election (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C21 C25 J16 J24 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s40888-023-00320-z

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