Control freaks or good parents? Entrepreneurial motivation and firms’ innovative performance

Piero Esposito and Francesco Ferrante ()
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Francesco Ferrante: Università di Cassino e del Lazio Meridionale

Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, 2024, vol. 41, issue 3, No 5, 739-769

Abstract: Abstract The Schumpeterian perspective posits the entrepreneur as the central figure driving innovation, with firms serving as conduits for bringing these innovations to market. A significant share of entrepreneurs exhibits minimal interest in innovation or growth and are driven by non-monetary incentives inherent in entrepreneurial pursuits. This paper challenges prevailing notions by asserting that a key motivator for entrepreneurship lies in the enjoyment of managerial control, manifested as a desire for authority over others. Leveraging data from the EFIGE dataset, we investigate the relevance of this motivation and its correlation with firms’ innovative strategies and performance. Our findings inform discussions on the formulation of policies aimed at fostering innovative entrepreneurship.

Keywords: Motivations; Entrepreneurship; Non-monetary benefits; Organizational choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s40888-024-00347-w

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