Explaining the decision to vote: non-nested and nested tests of three competing theories

Richard Jankowski ()
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Richard Jankowski: SUNY

Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, 2024, vol. 41, issue 3, No 1, 639-656

Abstract: Abstract Downs’ (1957) showed that it was irrational to vote, and irrational to acquire political information if one’s sole motivation is economic, self-interest. In response, three solutions have been proposed. Voters are motivated by: expressive identification; civic duty; and weak altruism. There is no consensus as to why individuals vote. One reason is that none of the previous tests tested the competing theories against each other. To overcome the limitation of past tests, I use a MTURK survey, which has measures of all the competing theories. I then perform non-nested (Vuong and Clarke) and nested tests of the competing theories. Non-nested testing assumes that the competing theories are strictly exclusive, i.e., only one theory is correct. Nested tests assume that elements of the competing models are combined. My evidence tentatively supports a nested model of voting behavior.

Keywords: Voting; Civic-duty; Altruism; Expressive; Non-nested; Nested (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s40888-024-00349-8

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