Miscarriages of justice in judges’ mind: theory and experimental evidence

Stefania Ottone, Ferruccio Ponzano, Margherita Saraceno and Luca Zarri ()
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Stefania Ottone: Department of Economics and Statistics “Cognetti de Martiis”, University of Turin
Ferruccio Ponzano: DIGSPES, Department, University of Piemonte Orientale
Margherita Saraceno: Department of Law, University of Pavia
Luca Zarri: University of Verona

Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, 2025, vol. 42, issue 2, No 7, 479-499

Abstract: Abstract This study investigates—both theoretically and by means of a controlled laboratory experiment—judges’ decisions in cases when either “type-I” errors (i.e., convicting an innocent defendant) or “type-II” errors (i.e., acquitting a guilty defendant) can occur. Our findings indicate that judges are sensitive to both types of error. Furthermore, in both error scenarios we detect “compensatory leniency” in judicial decision making, with participants seeming to balance the inherent trade-off between the errors by managing jointly the two key levers that they are given by our design: (1) the decision on conviction/acquittal and (2) the decision on the severity of punishment.

Keywords: Judicial errors; Miscarriages of justice; Economic experiments; Law and economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 K42 K49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s40888-025-00357-2

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