Impact of a financial risk-sharing scheme on budget-impact estimations: a game-theoretic approach

Arieh Gavious (), Dan Greenberg, Ariel Hammerman () and Ella Segev

The European Journal of Health Economics, 2014, vol. 15, issue 5, 553-561

Abstract: In reaction to applying a substantial risk-sharing rebate α on the manufacturer, both players are expected to adjust their budget estimates toward an optimal equilibrium. Increasing α is a better vehicle for reaching the desired equilibrium rather than increasing γ, as the manufacturer’s rebate α substantially influences both players, whereas γ has little effect on the players behavior. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: Risk sharing; Health plans; Pharmaceutical industry; Budget impact; I11; C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10198-013-0544-6

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