Reputation, public information, and physician adoption of an innovation

J. G. Smythe ()

The European Journal of Health Economics, 2002, vol. 3, issue 2, 103-110

Abstract: A dynamic expected utility framework is developed to explore the timing and extent of a physician’s adoption of an innovation. The benefits to adoption are uncertain, although an informative public information signal is released with some delay and possibly some inaccuracy. Improvements to the accuracy of the signal do not necessarily cause risk-averse physicians to scale back adoption prior to the signal’s release — if physicians are confident enough in the innovation’s worth, they may accelerate early adoption in order to capture an earlymover advantage in reputation building. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Keywords: Adoption; Innovation; Physicians; Uncertainty; Public information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10198-002-0099-4 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:eujhec:v:3:y:2002:i:2:p:103-110

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... cs/journal/10198/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10198-002-0099-4

Access Statistics for this article

The European Journal of Health Economics is currently edited by J.-M.G.v.d. Schulenburg

More articles in The European Journal of Health Economics from Springer, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().