General Analysis of Cournot Mixed Oligopoly with Partial Privatization
Koji Okuguchi ()
Eurasian Economic Review, 2012, vol. 2, issue 1, 48-62
A general model of Cournot mixed oligopoly with partial privatization of a public firm is formulated, and the existence and stability of a unique equilibrium and optimality of partial privatization are proved under fundamental assumptions allowing for general inverse market demand and firm’ cost functions. The stability condition which is derived on the basis of a stability theorem for a dynamic system for an aggregative game is interpreted from economic point of view for some simple cases, and is specified for Cournot mixed duopoly with partial privatization. The stability condition is also compared with the one for Cournot oligopoly with only private firms. Copyright Eurasia Business and Economics Society 2012
Keywords: Mixed Oligopoly; Public Firm; Partial Privatization; Equilibrium; L13; D43; H32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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