What makes banking crisis resolution difficult? Lessons from Japan and the Nordic Countries
Michael Diemer () and
Uwe Vollmer ()
Eurasian Economic Review, 2015, vol. 5, issue 2, 277 pages
Banking crisis resolution is often a long-lasting process with large fiscal and social costs. We ask which difficulties authorities face when choosing and implementing resolution packages. We survey the literature analyzing the impact of single resolution instruments on moral hazard and fiscal costs. We argue that no best-practice resolution package exists and that the implementation of a package is subject to coordination failures. Since crisis resolution packages are country-specific, we follow a case-study approach and describe how regulators in Japan and the Nordic countries during the 1990s solved their financial crises. We identify several obstacles the authorities in these countries were faced with and analyse their crisis resolution in the context of moral hazard and fiscal costs. Finally, we use these lessons to reassess the policy reactions in the US and in Europe during the recent financial crisis. Copyright Eurasia Business and Economics Society 2015
Keywords: Banking crisis; Resolution instruments; Lender of last resort; Owner of last resort; Political coase theorem; E65; G18; H12; N24; N25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:eurase:v:5:y:2015:i:2:p:251-277
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
Eurasian Economic Review is currently edited by Dorothea Schäfer
More articles in Eurasian Economic Review from Springer, Eurasia Business and Economics Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().