Intelligent minority game with genetic crossover strategies

M. Sysi-Aho, A. Chakraborti () and K. Kaski

The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, 2003, vol. 34, issue 3, 373-377

Abstract: We have developed a novel game theoretical model of N interacting agents playing a minority game such that they change their strategies intelligently or adaptively depending on their temporal performances. The strategy changes are done by generating new strategies through one-point genetic crossover mechanism. The performances of agents are found to change dramatically (from losing to winning or otherwise) and the game moves rapidly to an efficient state, in which fluctuations in the number of agents performing a particular action, characterized by the variance $\sigma^2$ , reaches a low value. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003

Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1140/epjb/e2003-00234-0

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