EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Evolutionary fate of memory-one strategies in repeated prisoner’s dilemma game in structured populations

Xu-Sheng Liu, Zhi-Xi Wu (), Michael Z. Q. Chen () and Jian-Yue Guan
Additional contact information
Xu-Sheng Liu: Institute of Computational Physics and Complex Systems, Lanzhou University
Zhi-Xi Wu: Institute of Computational Physics and Complex Systems, Lanzhou University
Michael Z. Q. Chen: School of Automation, Nanjing University of Science and Technology
Jian-Yue Guan: Institute of Computational Physics and Complex Systems, Lanzhou University

The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, 2017, vol. 90, issue 7, 1-7

Abstract: Abstract We study evolutionary spatial prisoner’s dilemma game involving a one-step memory mechanism of the individuals whenever making strategy updating. In particular, during the process of strategy updating, each individual keeps in mind all the outcome of the action pairs adopted by himself and each of his neighbors in the last interaction, and according to which the individuals decide what actions they will take in the next round. Computer simulation results imply that win-stay-lose-shift like strategy win out of the memory-one strategy set in the stationary state. This result is robust in a large range of the payoff parameter, and does not depend on the initial state of the system. Furthermore, theoretical analysis with mean field and quasi-static approximation predict the same result. Thus, our studies suggest that win-stay-lose-shift like strategy is a stable dominant strategy in repeated prisoner’s dilemma game in homogeneous structured populations.

Keywords: Statistical; and; Nonlinear; Physics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1140/epjb/e2017-80219-0 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:eurphb:v:90:y:2017:i:7:d:10.1140_epjb_e2017-80219-0

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10051

DOI: 10.1140/epjb/e2017-80219-0

Access Statistics for this article

The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems is currently edited by P. Hänggi and Angel Rubio

More articles in The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems from Springer, EDP Sciences
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:spr:eurphb:v:90:y:2017:i:7:d:10.1140_epjb_e2017-80219-0