Promoting cooperation by reputation-based payoff transfer mechanism in public goods game

Ran Yang (), Tong Chen and Qiao Chen
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Ran Yang: College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University
Tong Chen: College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University
Qiao Chen: College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University

The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, 2020, vol. 93, issue 5, 1-8

Abstract: Abstract Considering the impact of reputation on social benefits of people in reality, we introduce the reputation-based payoff transfer mechanism to investigate cooperative behaviors on the lattice in the process of public goods game (PGG). Here individual reputation is quantified by score rules and players are ranked based on reputation scores. Payoffs can be transferred from low-ranking groups to high-ranking individuals via three different kinds of transfer ratios, and thus players with high rank receive endogenous bonus without the external funds. Numerical simulations show that the level of cooperation in PGG gets slightly increase in the type of conditional transfer ratios. But cooperation can be significantly promoted and maintained at a high level in the type of effective transfer ratios. The effect of transfer strength (s) is also considered. The greater the s, the higher the cooperation level for most transfer ratios. And when the optimal transfer ratio condition is met, cooperation can quickly be emergent and nearly reach global cooperation even if the synergy factor is small. Our research is helpful to shed light on the emergence of cooperation in PGG and provides useful advices for organizers to promote the collective supply of public goods from the perspective of reputation management. Graphical abstract

Keywords: Statistical; and; Nonlinear; Physics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1140/epjb/e2020-100618-x

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