Reputational preference-based payoff punishment promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemmas

Xiang Wei (), Peng Xu (), Shuiting Du (), Guanghui Yan () and Huayan Pei ()
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Xiang Wei: State Grid Gansu Information and Telecommunication Company
Peng Xu: State Grid Gansu Information and Telecommunication Company
Shuiting Du: State Grid Gansu Information and Telecommunication Company
Guanghui Yan: Lanzhou Jiaotong University
Huayan Pei: Lanzhou Jiaotong University

The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, 2021, vol. 94, issue 10, 1-7

Abstract: Abstract To explore the incentive mechanisms of cooperation in social dilemmas. Motivated by preference for reputation in indirect reciprocity, we propose a reputational preference-based payoff punishment mechanism, under which an individual is punished if his reputation is lower than the average one of direct neighbors and his current game strategy is defection. The cost of punishment is shared by the immediate neighbors. Simulation results show that in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game and snowdrift game, the punishment mechanism reduces the fitness of both cooperators and defectors in the micro-perspective, whereas it significantly promotes the evolution of cooperation from the macro view. Furthermore, it is easier for cooperation to emerge and sustain in snowdrift game, and compared to prisoner’s dilemma game, within the most range of model parameters, the system is in the coexistence state of cooperators and defectors. Graphic abstract

Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1140/epjb/s10051-021-00212-w

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