When do creditors with heterogeneous beliefs agree to run?
Andrey Krishenik (),
Andreea Minca () and
Johannes Wissel ()
Finance and Stochastics, 2015, vol. 19, issue 2, 233-259
Abstract:
This paper explores, in a multiperiod setting, the funding liquidity of a borrower that finances its operations through short-term debt. The short-term debt is provided by a continuum of creditors with heterogeneous beliefs about the prospects of the borrower. In each period, creditors observe the borrower’s fundamentals and decide on the amount they invest in its short-term debt. We formalize this problem as a coordination game, and we show that there exists a unique reasonable Nash equilibrium. We show that the borrower is able to refinance if and only if the liquid net worth is above an illiquidity barrier, and we explicitly find this barrier in terms of the distribution of capital and beliefs across creditors. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Keywords: Liquidity risk; Credit risk; Nash equilibrium; Bank run; 91A10; 91A13; 91A20; 91A80; 91B69; 91B70; C72; C73; D53; D81; G11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:finsto:v:19:y:2015:i:2:p:233-259
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DOI: 10.1007/s00780-015-0259-x
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