On coordination of supply chain based on information asymmetry of effort level and fuzzy market environment

Xin Xu () and Hao Zan
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Xin Xu: Anhui University
Hao Zan: Anhui University

Fuzzy Information and Engineering, 2009, vol. 1, issue 1, 67-77

Abstract: Abstract The agent’s private information contributes greatly to a person to make principal decision in the supply of a chain coordination. Therefore, it is a great issue for him to design an effective incentive mechanism in order to get the true information from the agent in his principle making. Assuming that the demand depend upon an agent’s effort level and the fuzzy market condition, the author in this paper researches and analyzes the principle-agent problem under fuzzy information asymmetry condition by using the theory of principal-agent as well as incentive mechanism.

Keywords: Principal-agent theory; Incentive mechanism; Fuzzy information asymmetry; Market demand; Triangular fuzzy number; Lot-sizing order (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1007/s12543-009-0005-1

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