Hospital physician payment mechanisms in Austria: do they provide gateways to institutional corruption?

Margit Sommersguter-Reichmann () and Adolf Stepan ()
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Margit Sommersguter-Reichmann: Karl-Franzens University Graz
Adolf Stepan: Technical University Vienna

Health Economics Review, 2017, vol. 7, issue 1, 1-13

Abstract: Abstract Institutional corruption in the health care sector has gained considerable attention during recent years, as it acknowledges the fact that service providers who are acting in accordance with the institutional and environmental settings can nevertheless undermine a health care system’s purposes as a result of the (financial) conflicts of interest to which the service providers are exposed. The present analysis aims to contribute to the examination of institutional corruption in the health sector by analyzing whether the current payment mechanism of separately remunerating salaried hospital physicians for treating supplementary insured patients in public hospitals, in combination with the public hospital physician’s possibility of taking up dual practice as a self-employed physician with a private practice and/or as an attending physician in private hospitals, has the potential to undermine the primary purposes of the Austrian public health care system. Based on the analysis of the institutional design of the Austrian public hospital sector, legal provisions and directives have been identified, which have the potential to promote conduct on the part of the public hospital physician that systematically undermines the achievement of the Austrian public health system’s primary purposes.

Keywords: Public Hospital; Private Hospital; Institutional Design; Statutory Health Insurance; Hospital Physician (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1186/s13561-017-0148-4

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