Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics

2016 - 2024

Current editor(s): M.J. Holler, M. Kocher and K.K. Sieberg

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Editorial to the Special Issue “The Immortal Adam Smith” pp. 1-2: Heinz D. Kurz
Adam Smith’s Pluralism and the Limits of Science pp. 3-27: Richard Sturn
Market Dummy and Social Animal: Adam Smith’s Models of Man pp. 29-50: Manfred J. Holler
Isaac Newton, Robert Simson and Adam Smith pp. 51-66: Mark Knell
Corn, Cattle, Land and Labour: Physiocratic Ideas in the Wealth of Nations pp. 67-90: Christian Gehrke
Karl Marx’s reading of Adam Smith pp. 91-121: Jonathan F. Cogliano and Duncan K. Foley
Adam Smith: Evolutionary Social Theorist ante litteram pp. 123-152: Heinz D. Kurz

Giuseppe Eusepi (1949–2020) pp. 1-3: Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt
Deconstructing Public Debt: Who Owes What to Whom? pp. 5-17: Richard E. Wagner
Subjectivism and Constitutionalism pp. 19-38: Alan Hamlin
Politics as Exchange? pp. 39-59: Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt
Is a Minimal Federal European Constitution for the European Union Necessary? Some Preliminary Suggestions Using Public Choice Analysis pp. 61-78: Friedrich Schneider
On Curing Political Diseases: The Healing Power of Majoritarian Elections in Multi-Member Districts pp. 79-93: Reiner Eichenberger and Patricia Schafer
Is Public Choice Still Vivid? pp. 95-101: Bruno Frey
Correction to: Giuseppe Eusepi (1949–2020) pp. 103-103: Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt

Special Issue on “Crooked Thinking or Straight Talk: Modernizing Epicurean Scientific Philosophy” pp. 113-116: Manfred J. Holler and Hartmut Kliemt
The Social Contract, the Game of Life and the Shadow of the Future pp. 117-125: Brian Skyrms
Ken Binmore: Behavioral Scientist pp. 127-144: Luciano Andreozzi
An Epicurean State of Nature pp. 145-184: Peter Vanderschraaf
The Pleasures of Tranquillity pp. 185-197: Alex Voorhoeve
Vaihinger’s Fictionalism Meets Binmore’s Knowledge-as-Commitment pp. 199-217: John Weymark
Why Have Leaders At All? Hume and Hobbes, with a Dash of Nash pp. 219-244: Kaushik Basu
Philosophic Fables pp. 245-257: Gerald Gaus and John Thrasher
Bargaining, Fairness and Conflict pp. 259-288: Charles Holt and Katri K. Sieberg

Albert@100 ‒ Special Issue in Honor of Hans Albert pp. 1-2: Max Albert and Hartmut Kliemt
Hans Albert’s Systematic Approach to Critical Rationalism pp. 3-24: Jitka Paitlová
Critical rationalism and metaethics pp. 25-35: Armin Engländer
How to Escape from Model Platonism in Economics: Critical Assumptions, Robust Conclusions, and Approximate Explanations pp. 37-68: Max Albert
An Albertian View of Buchanan’s Contractarianism pp. 69-82: Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt
The Economic Tradition and the Problem of Social Order: Hans Albert’s Critique of Welfare Economics and the Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy pp. 83-111: Viktor J. Vanberg

Evaluating Utility Streams pp. 1-14: Ken Binmore
“Not This One”: Experimental Use of the Approval and Disapproval Ballot pp. 15-28: Annick Laruelle
Are Weighted Games Sufficiently Good for Binary Voting? pp. 29-36: Sascha Kurz
Elections with Multiple Positive and Negative Votes pp. 37-47: Tanya Gibbs and Henry Chappell
Corruption in Organizations: Some General Formulations and (In-)Corruptibility Results pp. 49-57: Fang-Fang Tang and Yongsheng Xu
Power in Networks: The Medici pp. 59-75: Manfred J. Holler and Florian Rupp
From Polytheism to Monotheism: Zoroaster and Some Economic Theory pp. 77-108: Mario Ferrero

Complexity, Power Laws and a Humean Argument in Risk Management: The Fundamental Inadequacy of Probability Theory as a Foundation for Modeling Complex Risk in Banking pp. 155-182: Christian Hugo Hoffmann and Charles Djordjevic
The Political Economy of Polytheism: the Indian Versus the Greco-Roman Religions pp. 183-211: Atin Basuchoudhary, Mario Ferrero and Timothy Lubin
Modelling the Quest for Status in Ancient Greece: Paying for Liturgies pp. 213-236: George Tridimas

Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining” pp. 1-6: Claus-Jochen Haake and Walter Trockel
Nonconvex Bargaining Problems: Some Recent Developments pp. 7-41: Yongsheng Xu and Naoki Yoshihara
Reconciling Consistency and Continuity: A Bounded-Population Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution pp. 43-57: William Thomson
Some Impossibility Results on the Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining pp. 59-65: Youngsub Chun
The Balanced Threat Agreement for Individual Externality Negotiation Problems pp. 67-85: Peter Borm, Yukihiko Funaki and Yuan Ju
The Nash Solution as a von Neumann–Morgenstern Utility Function on Bargaining Games pp. 87-104: Anke Gerber
A Concessions-Based Procedure for Meta-Bargaining Problems pp. 105-120: M. Carmen Marco, Josep E. Peris and Begoña Subiza
Divide and Invest: Bargaining in a Dynamic Framework pp. 121-153: Francesca Flamini

Coordination Failure in Capacity-then-Price-Setting Games pp. 111-133: Werner Güth, Manfred Stadler and Alexandra Zaby
Anti-Western Conspiracy Thinking in China and Russia: Empirical Evidence and its Link to Expectations of Collusion pp. 135-163: Alexander Libman and Björn Vollan
Group Identities in Conflicts pp. 165-192: Martin Kolmar and Andreas Wagener
On the Nature of Fair Behaviour: Further Evidence pp. 193-207: Agnès Festré
Success, Survival and Probabilistic Voting: The Case of a ruling Party pp. 209-226: Artyom Jelnov and Pavel Jelnov
Democracy as a Game of Trust: The Limits of Generality Constraints pp. 227-248: Alexandra Oprea
Partial Versus General Compulsory Solidarity: an Experimental Analysis pp. 249-279: Andrej Angelovski, Arianna Galliera and Werner Güth

Buchanan@100: Special Issue in Honor of James M. Buchanan pp. 1-5: Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt
Apple Trees for Firewood: James Buchanan’s Case for a Balanced Budget Amendment in the Context of U.S. Fiscal Policy pp. 7-23: Romina Boccia
Democracy Unchained: Contractualism, Individualism, and Independence in Buchanan’s Democratic Theory pp. 25-40: John Thrasher
Constitutionalizing Leviathan: A Critique of Buchanan’s Conception of Lawmaking pp. 41-69: Daniele Bertolini
Containing Ideological Rent Seekers Expanding the Reach of Buchanan’s Constitutionalism pp. 71-85: Kevin Vallier
The Status Quo in Buchanan’s Constitutional Contractarianism pp. 87-109: C. M. Melenovsky