Pure Bargaining Problems with a Coalition Structure

Francesc Carreras () and Guillermo Owen
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Francesc Carreras: Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC)
Guillermo Owen: Naval Postgraduate School

Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, 2016, vol. 33, issue 1, No 12, 93-120

Abstract: Abstract We consider here pure bargaining problems endowed with a coalition structure such that each union is given its own utility. In this context we use the Shapley rule in order to assess the main options available to the agents: individual behavior, cooperative behavior, isolated unions behavior, and bargaining unions behavior. The latter two respectively recall the treatment given by Aumann–Drèze and Owen to cooperative games with a coalition structure. A numerical example illustrates the procedure. We provide criteria to compare any pair of behaviors for each agent, introduce and axiomatically characterize a modified Shapley rule, and determine its natural domain, that is, the set of problems where the bargaining unions behavior is the best option for all agents.

Keywords: Pure bargaining problem; Coalition structure; Shapley rule; 91A12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s41412-016-0007-2

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