How Institutions Shape Land Deals: The Role of Corruption

Matthias Bujko, Christian Fischer, Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks
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Matthias Bujko: University of Freiburg
Christian Fischer: University of Freiburg

Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, 2016, vol. 33, issue 3, No 2, 205-217

Abstract: Abstract Large-scale land acquisitions often take place in developing countries which are also known for their corruption-friendliness caused by weak institutional frameworks. We hypothesize that corruption indeed leads to more land deals. We argue that corrupt elites exploit poor institutional set-ups (characterized by corruption) to strike deals with domestic and international investors at the expense of local populations. Using panel data for 156 countries from 2000 to 2011, we provide evidence that large-scale land deals indeed occur more often in countries with higher levels of corruption. The estimated effects are also economically substantive and particularly relevant to economies with unsound institutions.

Keywords: Large-scale land acquisitions; Land grabbing; Foreign investments; Weak institutions; Corruption; F21; O13; Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: How Institutions Shape Land Deals: The Role of Corruption (2015)
Working Paper: How institutions shape land deals: The role of corruption (2014)
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DOI: 10.1007/s41412-016-0021-4

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