The Political Economy of Land Grabbing

Tim Krieger and Martin Leroch

Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, 2016, vol. 33, issue 3, No 1, 197-204

Abstract: Abstract We propose a comprehensive model of the political economy of land grabbing. It is based on arguments related to property rights assignments, societal power relations along the core-periphery dimension as well as distributional, ethnic and resource-exhausting conflict. In times of global “land rush”, the (corrupt) elite in the core increasingly considers land in the periphery as a valuable resource, thereby challenging existing formal or informal land rights of the local population. This state intrusion in the periphery could be the source of significant (ethnic) grievances resulting in disagreement and conflict.

Keywords: Large-scale land acquisitions; Land grabbing; Weak institutions; Core vs. periphery; Internal migration; Conflict; Land rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F21 O13 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: The political economy of land grabbing (2015)
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DOI: 10.1007/s41412-016-0022-3

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