International Land Acquisitions and Hal Varian’s Concept of Fairness

Luis Tomás Montilla Fernández () and Johannes Schwarze ()
Additional contact information
Luis Tomás Montilla Fernández: University of Hamburg
Johannes Schwarze: University of Hamburg

Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, 2016, vol. 33, issue 3, No 6, 295 pages

Abstract: Abstract Prices of, specifically, primary foods spiked during the global food crisis of 2007–2008. This motivated governments with food security concerns and profit-seeking investors to engage in large-scale land acquisitions (LSLA) in mainly least developed countries (LDCs). In economic terms, this reaction is desirable for two reasons: (1) more efficient production lowers food prices and increased food production improves food security; on the other hand, (2) least developed host countries benefit from development opportunities. Drawing on Hal Varian’s (1974) concept of fairness, this article contributes an ethical perspective on the matter: particularly based on the analysis of 81 investment contracts, this partial analysis understands LSLA into Sub Saharan LDCs as a socio-economic reform. It focuses only on two affected groups when land is redistributed from LDCs’ local smallholders to foreign investors. It concludes that LSLA predominantly contradict Varian’s concept in practice as they hardly if at all improve the situation of local smallholders who might in extreme cases even suffer human rights violations.

Keywords: Agricultural investments; Ethics; Economic fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 O13 Q17 Q18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s41412-016-0023-2 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:homoec:v:33:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s41412-016-0023-2

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/41412

DOI: 10.1007/s41412-016-0023-2

Access Statistics for this article

Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics is currently edited by M.J. Holler, M. Kocher and K.K. Sieberg

More articles in Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().