Pitfalls on the Road to Frey’s Democracy of the Future

Antoaneta Dimitrova and Bernard Steunenberg
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Antoaneta Dimitrova: Leiden University

Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, 2017, vol. 34, issue 2, No 9, 213-222

Abstract: Abstract In this article, we discuss some of the recent proposals developed by Bruno Frey for making future societies more democratic and prosperous. While sharing Frey’s conviction that new ways of involving citizens in political decision-making in representative democracies are needed, we engage in debate on his proposals on voting rights, referenda and randomized decision-making. We are critical of the random selection of office-holders proposed by Frey, suggesting it may lead to alienation by citizens from the political process and would not really address the perceptional gap between elites and the broader public. Mindful of the pitfalls inherent in the increasing use of referenda, we suggest pre-referendum deliberation rather than the post-referendum conciliation proposed by Frey. Furthermore, we believe that it is almost impossible to propose good solutions without engaging the different arguments and empirical findings exploring the substantive as well as the procedural causes of democratic discontent.

Keywords: Democracy; Deliberation; Institutional change; Voting rights; Referenda; Randomized decision-making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s41412-017-0045-4

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