Uncertain Acts in Games

Frank Riedel

Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, 2017, vol. 34, issue 4, No 3, 275-292

Abstract: Abstract This text reviews a recent approach to modeling “radically uncertain” behavior in strategic interactions. By rigorously rooting the approach in decision theory, we provide a foundation for applications of Knightian uncertainty in mechanism design, principal agent and moral hazard models. We discuss critical assessments and provide alternative interpretations of the new equilibria in terms of equilibrium in beliefs, and as a boundedly rational equilibrium in the sense of a population equilibrium. We also discuss the purification of equilibria in the spirit of Harsanyi.

Keywords: Knightian uncertainty in games; Strategic ambiguity; Ellsberg games; Purification; C72; D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s41412-017-0061-4 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: Uncertain acts in games (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:homoec:v:34:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s41412-017-0061-4

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/41412

DOI: 10.1007/s41412-017-0061-4

Access Statistics for this article

Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics is currently edited by M.J. Holler, M. Kocher and K.K. Sieberg

More articles in Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().