Divine Competition in Greco–Roman Polytheism

Mario Ferrero and George Tridimas ()
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George Tridimas: Ulster Business School

Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, 2018, vol. 35, issue 3, No 1, 143-166

Abstract: Abstract This paper surveys the main features of polytheistic religious organization in the ancient Greek and Roman world, emphasizing two aspects: there was substantial, multiple overlap between the jurisdictions of different gods, which increased over time and made the costs and uncertainty borne by supplicants ever more burdensome; and the priesthood was in general not a profession but a service undertaken, or assigned, in addition to political or military office. The growth of elective cults in the imperial age further complicated the range of offers but did not create a class of religious entrepreneurs. A simple economic model shows that such jurisdictional overlap was inefficient and that supplicants stood to gain from concentration and unification of the industry—that is, from one-stop shopping. This did not happen until the very end of paganism, so competition did not work. The reason for this non-event is found in the absence of a professional religious class with a vested interest in its occupation, one which could act as an interest group and profit from the unification of supply. This in turn suggests a nonstandard explanation of why, unlike other polytheistic systems such as Hinduism, Greco–Roman paganism died out without leaving a trace or any attempt at revival.

Keywords: Greco–Roman polytheism; Priests; Religious competition; Economics of religion; Interest groups; One-stop shopping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 Z12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s41412-018-0070-y

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