Public Economies and the Endogenous Choice of Institutions

Eduardo Zambrano and Patrick Holder ()
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Patrick Holder: The Brattle Group

Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, 2018, vol. 35, issue 3, No 3, 185-206

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we provide a framework in which to formalize the seminal work of Elinor Ostrom on the study of public economies, a prominent theoretical construct aimed at providing answers to the following questions: (1) why are some societies able to solve their collective action problems and others are not? and (2) why do societies choose the particular institutions they choose from a vast array of possible choices?

Keywords: Public economies; Institutional design; Collective action (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s41412-018-0075-6

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