A Concessions-Based Procedure for Meta-Bargaining Problems

M. Carmen Marco (), Josep E. Peris and Begoña Subiza
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M. Carmen Marco: Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena

Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, 2020, vol. 37, issue 1, No 7, 105-120

Abstract: Abstract In 1950, Nash’s seminal paper introduced the axiomatic approach to the analysis of bargaining situations. Since then, many bargaining solutions have been proposed and axiomatically analyzed. The fact that agents, when face with a bargaining problem, can come up with different solution concepts (that is, different notions of fairness and equity) was first introduced by van Damme (J Econ Theory 38:78–100, 1986) with the meta-bargaining model. In this paper we present and axiomatically analyze a procedure for solving meta-bargaining problems, which we call Unanimous–Concession. As an example, we show that the Nash solution is the result of the meta-bargaining process we define, when agents have dual egalitarian criteria. Finally, we compare, from an axiomatic point of view, our proposal with other meta-bargaining procedures.

Keywords: Bargaining problem; Procedure; Meta-bargaining; Axiomatic approach (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s41412-020-00096-8

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