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Corruption in Organizations: Some General Formulations and (In-)Corruptibility Results

Fang-Fang Tang () and Yongsheng Xu ()
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Fang-Fang Tang: Peking University
Yongsheng Xu: Georgia State University

Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, 2021, vol. 38, issue 1, No 5, 49-57

Abstract: Abstract In a classical social choice framework, this paper presents two formulations of the notion of corruption and examines their consequences for decision making in an organization. It is shown that any organization is corruptible if a minimal concept of corruption is used to diagnose corruptibility; however, if a more demanding concept of corruption is applied, there are organizations that are immune to such stronger forms of corruption. There are no constitutionally incorruptible organizational forms but weakly incorruptible constitutions can exist.

Keywords: Constitutional economics; (In-)Corruptible selection functions/constitutions; Corruptibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D73 H0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s41412-021-00112-5

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