Transitions in the negotiations on climate change: from prisoner’s dilemma to chicken and beyond

Karen Pittel and Dirk Rübbelke

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2012, vol. 12, issue 1, 23-39

Keywords: 2-Person games; Adaptation; Ancillary benefits; Climate change; First-mover advantage; International negotiations; Chicken game; Prisoner’s dilemma game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10784-010-9126-6

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