EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

International environmental agreements with agenda and interaction between pollutants

Jing Xu ()
Additional contact information
Jing Xu: Southwestern University of Finance and Economics

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2018, vol. 18, issue 2, 153-174

Abstract: Abstract This paper analyzes how the sequence of negotiating agreements on each pollutant affects coalition behavior in international environmental agreements (IEAs) when multiple and correlated pollutants exist. I consider a model in which countries suffer from two pollutants with different externality characteristics and attempt to cooperate by sequentially negotiating on IEAs. The membership outcome depends on the environmental concern, abatement technology, spillover effect and most importantly the correlation between pollutants as either substitutes or complements. I find that cooperation in the first stage can facilitate later negotiations and that countries are prone to cooperate on a pollutant of common concern. Moreover, except for symmetric countries, different negotiation agendas may result in distinctive participation outcomes when pollutants are complements. Therefore, with systematic policy design, the negotiation sequence can serve as another method to encourage participation and cooperation in IEAs.

Keywords: Environmental agreement; Multiple pollutants; Negotiation agenda; Membership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10784-018-9390-4 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ieaple:v:18:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10784-018-9390-4

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10784

Access Statistics for this article

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics is currently edited by Joyeeta Gupta

More articles in International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().

 
Page updated 2019-06-19
Handle: RePEc:spr:ieaple:v:18:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10784-018-9390-4