International environmental agreements with agenda and interaction between pollutants
Jing Xu ()
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Jing Xu: Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2018, vol. 18, issue 2, 153-174
Abstract This paper analyzes how the sequence of negotiating agreements on each pollutant affects coalition behavior in international environmental agreements (IEAs) when multiple and correlated pollutants exist. I consider a model in which countries suffer from two pollutants with different externality characteristics and attempt to cooperate by sequentially negotiating on IEAs. The membership outcome depends on the environmental concern, abatement technology, spillover effect and most importantly the correlation between pollutants as either substitutes or complements. I find that cooperation in the first stage can facilitate later negotiations and that countries are prone to cooperate on a pollutant of common concern. Moreover, except for symmetric countries, different negotiation agendas may result in distinctive participation outcomes when pollutants are complements. Therefore, with systematic policy design, the negotiation sequence can serve as another method to encourage participation and cooperation in IEAs.
Keywords: Environmental agreement; Multiple pollutants; Negotiation agenda; Membership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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