The self-selection of democracies into treaty design: insights from international environmental agreements

Tobias Böhmelt () and Edita Butkutė ()
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Tobias Böhmelt: University of Essex
Edita Butkutė: University College London

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2018, vol. 18, issue 3, No 3, 367 pages

Abstract: Abstract Generally, democratic regime type is positively associated with participating in international environmental agreements. In this context, this study focuses on the legal nature of an agreement, which is linked to audience costs primarily at the domestic level that occur in case of non-compliance and are felt especially by democracies. Eventually, more legalized (“hard-law”) treaties make compliance potentially more challenging and as democratic leaders may anticipate the corresponding audience costs, the likelihood that democracies select themselves into such treaties decreases. The empirical implication of our theory is that environmental agreements with a larger share of democratic members are less likely to be characterized by hard law. Results from quantitative analyses strongly support our argument, shed new light on the relationship between participation in international agreements and the form of government, and also have implications for the “words-deeds” debate in international environmental policy-making.

Keywords: Democracy; Design; International environmental agreements; Legalization; Quantitative methods; Treaties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10784-018-9391-3

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