Experimenting with TripleCOPs: Productive innovation or counterproductive complexity?

Jen Iris Allan, David Downie () and Jessica Templeton
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Jen Iris Allan: Carleton University
David Downie: Fairfield University
Jessica Templeton: London School of Economics

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2018, vol. 18, issue 4, No 6, 557-572

Abstract: Abstract The Basel, Rotterdam, and Stockholm Conventions are engaged in a path-breaking “synergies” initiative that coordinates and even integrates parts of their administration, operation, and implementation. This includes holding TripleCOPs during which their Conference of the Parties meet together in sequential and simultaneous sessions. This article provides a preliminary analysis of this unprecedented experimentation. We find several important positive and negative procedural, political, and policy consequences of the new format, including: countries with large delegations hold a variety of advantages; developing countries can potentially leverage negotiating strength in one convention to advance concerns in another; it is easier to address the environmentally sound management of chemicals and wastes holistically as well as specific technical issues that involve two or more of the treaties; and new opportunities exist for brinkmanship, obstruction, and cross-treaty negotiating that can make reaching agreement on some issues more difficult.

Keywords: Conference of the parties; Stockholm Convention; Rotterdam Convention; Basel Convention; Synergies; POPs; Toxic chemicals; Hazardous waste; Environmental regimes; International environmental agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10784-018-9404-2

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