Market Darwinism vs. Market Creationism: Adaptability and Fairness in the Design of Greenhouse Gas Trading Mechanisms

Brent Haddad () and John Palmisano ()

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2001, vol. 1, issue 4, 427-446

Keywords: air pollution regulation; allowance trading; emissions trading; greenhouse gases; international institutions; Kyoto Protocol; market-based mechanisms; regulatory program design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1013330417973

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