Market Darwinism vs. Market Creationism: Adaptability and Fairness in the Design of Greenhouse Gas Trading Mechanisms
Brent Haddad () and
John Palmisano ()
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2001, vol. 1, issue 4, 427-446
Keywords: air pollution regulation; allowance trading; emissions trading; greenhouse gases; international institutions; Kyoto Protocol; market-based mechanisms; regulatory program design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ieaple:v:1:y:2001:i:4:p:427-446
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics is currently edited by Joyeeta Gupta
More articles in International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().